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Abstract
In recent years, non-pharmacologic approaches to modifying human neural activity have gained
increasing attention. One of these approaches is brain stimulation, which involves either the direct
application of electrical current to structures in the nervous system or the indirect application of
current by means of electromagnetic induction. Interventions that manipulate the brain have
generally been regarded as having both the potential to alleviate devastating brain-related
conditions and the capacity to create unforeseen and unwanted consequences. Hence, although
brain stimulation techniques offer considerable benefits to society, they also raise a number of
ethical concerns. In this paper we will address various dilemmas related to brain stimulation in the
context of clinical practice and biomedical research. We will survey current work involving deep
brain stimulation (DBS), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS). We will reflect upon relevant similarities and differences between them, and
consider some potentially problematic issues that may arise within the framework of established
principles of medical ethics: nonmaleficence and beneficence, autonomy, and justice.

Keywords
neuroethics; medical ethics; brain stimulation; deep brain stimulation; transcranial direct current
stimulation; transcranial magnetic stimulation

Introduction
In recent years, non-pharmacologic approaches to modifying human neural activity have
gained increasing attention. One of these approaches is brain stimulation, which involves
either the direct application of electrical current to structures in the nervous system or the
indirect application of current by means of electromagnetic induction. Deep Brain
Stimulation (DBS) has been discussed widely in the medical, scientific, and ethical
literature, and is currently being employed as a therapy. In addition, less invasive techniques
for stimulating the brain, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial
direct current stimulation (tDCS) are being explored increasingly as investigative and
therapeutic techniques (Figure 1). In this paper we will specifically address these three
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techniques. Although there are other widely used techniques for stimulating the central
nervous system (such as Vagus Nerve Stimulation), we will focus our attention on those
technologies for which there has been a large and growing literature demonstrating their
ability to manipulate cognition. This is especially true of TMS and tDCS. We are also
interested in discussing techniques that have been debated prominently in the neuroethical
literature, as is the case with DBS.
Even though the technology required to perform human brain stimulation has existed for a
number of years, it is only recently that the enormous potential of these approaches in
cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychology, psychiatry, and neurology has been more fully
realized (Wagner et al. 2007). Compared to other therapeutic interventions, brain stimulation
has a number of real and theoretical advantages that prompt us to consider how it is being
used in the present and how it should be used in the future. In some instances brain
stimulation has already proven to be effective in treating disorders that are difficult to
manage using more conventional therapies (e.g. DBS and TMS for medication-refractory
depression). Also because brain stimulation is more focally targeted than most
pharmacologic therapies, it theoretically circumvents many of the undesired side effects of
other treatments and can potentially be tailored to meet the needs of individual patients
(Fregni and Pascual-Leone 2007). In addition, in some circumstances, brain stimulation has
been shown to be more cost-effective than typical pharmaceutical interventions
(Valldeoriola et al. 2007; Valldeoriola, 2011). In the case of TMS and tDCS, the ability to
induce persistent modulation of human cortical excitability and function in a minimally
invasive and painless way is a clear advantage over more invasive techniques. Moreover, for
certain techniques—most notably tDCS—practical aspects such as device size, cost, and
ease of use make it plausible that brain stimulation could someday be implemented in
environments with limited resources, such as in developing countries. Finally, these
techniques may now be moving beyond laboratories and clinics, and have started (or at least
have been envisioned) to play a role in the cognitive enhancement of healthy individuals.
While brain stimulation techniques offer considerable benefits to society as treatments for a
variety of debilitating neurologic and psychiatric conditions, they also raise a number of
concerns. Naturally, the implementation of new medical technologies introduces questions
regarding their use and potential abuse. In this way the ethical issues that arise with brain
stimulation are similar to those raised by any other treatment. However, technologies such as
brain stimulation that specifically have the capacity to alter cognitive abilities and patterns
of thought also merit special consideration, since they may raise unique concerns related to
personhood and identity. In this paper we will address various issues related to brain
stimulation in the clinical setting, focusing on interventions that modulate cognition. We
will survey current work involving DBS, TMS and tDCS, reflect upon relevant similarities
and differences between them, and consider some potentially problematic issues that may
arise within the framework of established principles of medical ethics.

Overview of brain stimulation techniques
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is an invasive technique that stimulates brain structures that
lie deeper than the cerebral cortex, including but not limited to the basal ganglia, thalamus,
and deep portions of the cingulate gyrus. The DBS system consists of: (1) a lead, (2) an
extension, and (3) the implanted pulse generator (neurostimulator), which is placed below
the skin. The lead, a thin electrode, is inserted through a small opening in the skull and
implanted in the brain, with its tip positioned within the targeted brain area. The extension,
an insulated wire, is passed under the skin of the head, neck and shoulder, connecting the
lead to the neurostimulator (UNC School of Medicine 2012). The neurostimulator
(sometimes called a ‘brain pacemaker’) delivers a constant high frequency stimulus to the
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tip of the lead, and is usually implanted under the patient’s clavicle or abdomen (Lozano et
al. 2002; UNC School of Medicine 2012). To date, the precise mechanism of action of DBS
remains unclear (Ponce and Lozano 2010); however it is thought that the stimulation
induced by this system may interrupt specific circuits in the brain that are overactive in
different disease states.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a minimally invasive technique that allows for
both neurostimulation and neuromodulation (Wagner et al. 2007). It involves an
electromagnet, which generates a rapid time-varying magnetic field in a coil of wire, that
when held to the head of a subject creates magnetic pulses that penetrate the scalp and the
skull, inducing a small localized electrical current parallel to the plane of the coil in the
brain. This induced current is sufficient to depolarize neuronal membranes and generate
action potentials (Hamilton et al. 2011). Depending on the frequency, intensity, and
temporal pattern of stimulation, TMS can be employed to focally induce either excitatory or
inhibitory cortical activity (Benali et al. 2011). Single-pulse TMS has long been used as a
neurophysiologic tool to assess and briefly modulate cortical excitability, and has also been
used to assess the integrity of central neural pathways in the brain and spinal cord. Closely
paired pulses of TMS—administered either within the same hemisphere or
bihemispherically—have also been used to explore cortical excitability. In contrast to the
very transient effects of these techniques, repetitive TMS (rTMS) employs longer trains of
pulses, which can induce neurophysiologic and behavioural effects that can outlast the
period of stimulation (Pascual-Leone et al.1999). It is thought that the mechanisms that drive
these persistent post-stimulation rTMS effects are analogous to those seen in animal models
of long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD) (Korchounov and Ziemann
2011, Pascual-Leone et al.1999). Our discussion of the real and theoretical concerns
associated with TMS will focus on treatments involving rTMS, since other approaches have
not been associated with persistent changes in brain activity or behavior.
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a minimally invasive technique that differs
from TMS in that it only allows for neuromodulation and not neurostimulation (Wagner et
al. 2007). The technique involves applying a weak direct current (1–2mA) to the scalp via
electrodes (an anode and a cathode), which deliver current to underlying tissues, including
the brain. Only a portion of the applied current enters the skull (Priori et al. 2009). TDCS
differs qualitatively from TMS because the current applied to the brain is insufficient to
induce the rapid shift in neuronal membrane potentials required to produce action potentials
(Nitsche et al. 2008). Rather, it is believed that tDCS modulates cerebral activity by
inducing incremental shifts of cortical excitability (Nitsche and Paulus 2001; Nitsche et al.
2005; Nitsche et al. 2008). TDCS can have prolonged effects, lasting from minutes to hours
depending on the intensity, polarity and duration of stimulation applied (Priori 2003). These
effects have been attributed to neuronal changes that affect synaptic connectivity, including
synthesis of specific proteins and modification of intracellular cAMP and calcium levels
(Nitsche et al. 2008). Like TMS, it has also been suggested that tDCS induces neuroplastic
changes that are physiologically similar to long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term
depression (LTD) (Nitsche et al 2003).

Comparison of brain stimulation techniques
There are clear differences between DBS, TMS, and tDCS that inform the contexts in which
they have been and can be used. Perhaps the most obvious of these differences is that DBS
is an invasive technology, in that it involves surgical implantation of an electrode (or
electrodes in the case of bilateral DBS) within the brain parenchyma. DBS is therefore
associated with surgical risks such as bleeding or infection. Patients with DBS sometimes
require further surgeries in cases where the batteries of the neurostimulator are depleted or
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malfunctioning (Blomstedt and Hariz 2005; Merkel et al. 2007). By contrast, TMS and
tDCS are applied externally (that is, they are placed in direct contact with the head or in
close proximity to it), and do not involve insertion of mechanical hardware into brain tissue.
TMS and tDCS are often classified as non-invasive to emphasize their external nature. In
this piece we refer to these two technologies as “minimally invasive”, in part to underscore
the notion that they impose exogenous magnetic fields or electrical currents upon the brain,
and can thus be considered at least somewhat invasive (George et al. 2009). While the fact
that TMS and tDCS do not require brain surgery is clearly an advantage, one difference and
potential drawback related to the minimally invasive nature of these technologies is that they
are much more limited in their ability to affect brain structures deeper than the cortex. The
fact that these techniques target very different sites in the brain leads to broad differences in
the disease processes for which invasive and minimally invasive stimulation techniques are
being explored. In addition, the spatial resolution of DBS is thought to be superior to that of
minimally invasive stimulation techniques, especially tDCS (Nitsche et al. 2008), allowing
for anatomic structures to be targeted precisely, which in turn yields specific clinical
benefits and minimizes stimulation side effects (Ponce and Lozano 2010). One practical
consideration is that compared to DBS minimally invasive brain stimulation techniques are
inexpensive, since they do not involve the costs and potential liabilities associated with
surgery. Finally, while TMS and tDCS can be employed in a variety of ways to pursue basic
studies of physiology and behavior, diagnostic procedures, and therapeutic interventions
(Pascual-Leone and Wagner 2007), DBS is generally only employed as a treatment because
of the risks and expense involved.
Comparison of TMS to tDCS reveals a number of relevant differences. As noted above,
TMS is capable of stimulating neuronal action potentials, whereas tDCS is only capable of
incrementally modulating the activity of neurons. Another difference is that single pulses or
short trains of TMS can be delivered with great temporal precision, which potentially
affords much greater temporal resolution than tDCS (Priori et al. 2009). While this is a
meaningful advantage for many cognitive neuroscience studies, the temporal precision of
TMS is perhaps less relevant to treatment studies, wherein long trains of rTMS are often
employed. Another potential disadvantage of tDCS in comparison with TMS is its relatively
low spatial resolution. However one can change the size of the electrodes to achieve a better
spatial resolution with tDCS (Nietsche et al. 2007), and investigators have recently
developed “high-definition” tDCS (HD-tDCS) systems designed to deliver more focal
stimulation (Datta et al. 2008). Nonetheless, conventional tDCS may theoretically be
preferable in cases where stimulation of a more distributed network of cortical sites is
desirable. Extending this notion, a theoretical advantage of tDCS is that by virtue of having
two possible sites of concurrent stimulation on the scalp (an anode and a cathode) this
technique may be especially useful in cases of unilateral injury, where “behavioural effects
occur not only through dysfunction at the damaged site, but also from overinhibition arising
from the contralateral healthy side of the brain” (Priori et al. 2009:243). Sham (placebo)
tDCS can be administered readily and is difficult to distinguish from actual stimulation
(Brunoni et al. 2012b; Gandiga et al. 2006). Moreover tDCS stimulators can be preprogrammed to deliver sham or real tDCS in a masked manner, so as to enable doubleblinded experimental designs (Nitsche et al. 2008). Sham TMS studies are more difficult to
execute, insofar as scalp sensations, facial muscle twitches, and noise generated by the coil
make it difficult to conceal whether or not real stimulation has been applied (Priori et al.
2009).
Although TMS may be a more spatially and temporally precise instrument than tDCS, there
are a number of practical considerations that make tDCS attractive as well. For instance,
tDCS is highly portable (it fits inside a briefcase and is battery powered) compared to TMS.
In addition, subjects undergoing tDCS have more freedom to move their heads during the
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course of stimulation compared to subjects receiving TMS, which allows tDCS to be used
more readily with existing behavioral tasks and therapies (Hamilton et al. 2011; Priori et al.
2009). Administration of TMS carries a small risk of inducing seizures, which has never
been reported with tDCS (Rossi et al. 2009). Importantly, the cost of a tDCS unit is
approximately an order of magnitude less than a TMS machine paired with
neuronavigational equipment and software. All of these characteristics give tDCS a greater
potential to be used in areas lacking resources or with poor infrastructure (such as
developing countries) (Brunoni et al. 2012b). These practical advantages also predispose
tDCS to use outside the clinical setting, potentially as a “do-it-yourself” technique. This
brings with it a host of ethical issues, which we will touch upon in the discussion section.

Better living through electricity: the therapeutic promise of brain
stimulation
A growing number of studies speak to the beneficial effects of brain stimulation in treating a
variety of conditions affecting the nervous system. DBS is supported by the most evidence,
as it has been in clinical use the longest out of the three technologies. The US Food and
Drug Association (FDA) has approved DBS as a treatment for essential tremor (1997),
Parkinson’s disease (2002) and dystonia (2003). Psychiatric applications of DBS are also
moving from experimental to clinical use (Synofzik and Schlaepfer 2011), and DBS is
currently being explored as a treatment for depression (Anderson et al. 2012; Mayberg et al.
2005), Tourette’s syndrome (Kuhn et al. 2009), Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (Laxton et al.
2010), anorexia (Wu et al. 2012), and alcoholism (Heldmann et al. 2012).
TMS (specifically repetitive TMS, or rTMS) was given FDA approval in 2008 as a
treatment for medication refractory depression. 1 There is also ongoing research into its
potential therapeutic benefits for a variety of other neurologic and psychiatric conditions,
including but not limited to motor dysfunction (Groppa et al. 2012), obsessive compulsive
disorder (OCD) (Wu et al. 2010), Alzheimer’s disease (Haffen et al. 2012), hallucinations in
schizophrenia (Guller et al. 2012), and pain disorders (Sampson et al. 2011).
Despite its benign side-effect profile, tDCS has not yet received approval from the FDA for
any clinical indication. However, promising data indicate that it may eventually prove
effective in treating major depressive disorder (Brunoni et al. 2012a; Brunoni et al. 2013),
motor and cognitive deficits after stroke (Schlaug et al. 2008), working memory deficits
(Fregni et al. 2005), and memory loss in patients with Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s
disease (Boggio et al. 2006). Moreover, it has been hypothesized that tDCS could be helpful
for the treatment of a variety of other conditions, such as anorexia nervosa (Hecht 2010).
Given the invasiveness, risks, and costs associated with DBS, it seems likely that less
invasive techniques such as TMS and tDCS will eventually be more widely used in clinical
settings.

The ethical challenges of brain stimulation
The notion of therapeutically altering brain function has always raised both hopes and fears,
and different interventions that accomplish this goal have always come with both promises
and perils. Neurotechnologies such as brain stimulation bring to the forefront a variety of
challenges that are “relatively novel and emerge primarily because of the very special status
of the brain in human life” (Farah 2010: 7; cf. Glannon 2007; Racine 2010). Direct
manipulation of the brain, for instance, has generally been regarded as an intervention with
1Even though TMS has FDA approval, its “clinical effect sizes are modest and the ultimate clinical significance remains unclear and
is still controversial” (George et al. 2009)
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both the potential to cure devastating brain-related conditions and the capacity to create
unforeseen and unwanted consequences including radical changes in the complex
perceptions, thoughts, motivations, and behaviors that confer upon us our humanity and our
personhood (Bell et al. 2009; Farah and Wolpe 2004; Hamilton et al. 2011; Heinrichs 2012).
Considering the potentially vulnerable status of many patients with brain disorders, the lack
of extensive data about effectiveness of these relatively new stimulation technologies, the
increasing exploration of these techniques for a variety of neurologic and psychiatric
indications, and the potential for their use in the absence of professional oversight
(specifically in the case of tDCS), we believe that the community of clinicians and
investigators employing brain stimulation in the context of clinical research and care needs
to take closer stock of the ethical concerns associated with these emerging technologies, and
should also identify a framework of principles that can be employed to inform both clinical
and research decision-making (Bell et al. 2009; Heinrichs 2012; Priori et al. 2009; Synofzik
and Schlaepfer 2011). In this paper, which focuses on the use of brain stimulation in clinical
practice and biomedical research, we will consider the ethical issues of brain stimulation
within the context of well-established principles of medical ethics: nonmaleficence and
beneficence, autonomy, and justice (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Here is it important to
emphasize that we are focusing on issues that could arise from either current or proposed
therapeutic applications of brain stimulation, rather than basic science investigations that
employ these technologies. However, we will also touch upon some basic studies of
physiology and cognition, insofar as they suggest that neurologic functions can be
manipulated and enhanced in ways that may someday be relevant to patients.

“First, do no harm”: nonmaleficence and beneficence in brain stimulation
The notions of acting in the interests of a patient (beneficence) and avoiding harm
(nonmaleficence) are central principles of bioethics that have guided the practice of
medicine since antiquity. Therefore, while these two concepts are certainly important to
brain stimulation techniques, they are in no way unique to them; we can draw on current
practices in clinical and research ethics to inform and guide the appropriate use of brain
stimulation. In clinical practice, beneficence and nonmaleficence are often addressed in
tandem, when a conversation takes place between a clinician and patient in which the risks
and benefits of a particular therapeutic intervention are discussed. In the clinical setting,
where the techniques have already been subjected to controlled clinical trials and been given
approval by government bodies for specific medical indications (e.g. FDA approval of DBS
for Parkinson’s Disease), the immediate benefits and risks likely to be faced by the patients
are relatively easy to predict and discuss based on existing data. This is less clear in the
clinical research setting, where therapies are still experimental and where only limited
evidence regarding either the benefits or the risks to patients may be available. Most
investigators currently conduct research within the guidelines established by regulatory
bodies in their institutions or by the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association
General Assembly 2001), both of which emphasize that in biomedical research the benefits
to a human subject and to society should exceed the risk imposed on the individual.
Nonetheless, the onus is on researchers to be frank about the fact that benefits are not certain
and that risks, in some cases, are not completely known.
With respect to known risks, each brain stimulation technique has its own unique safety
profile. Like in all clinical practices, it is important for physicians and others administering
therapies to thoroughly discuss safety issues with patients related to these technologies.
DBS, for example, is considered to be a largely reversible technique in spite of its invasive
features, because it is thought that the therapy does not leave permanent lesions (Ponce and
Lozano 2010). Nonetheless, considering the risks and side effects associated with the
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surgery (i.e. hemorrhage, infection, fracture, misplacement, or migration of the lead)
(Merkel et al. 2007), and the relative lack of long-term data with this relatively new
technique, this notion of reversibility is debatable. Indeed, given the potential risk associated
with surgical implantation of DBS electrodes, it has generally been employed as a treatment
of last resort for patients who are refractory to other forms of therapy. By contrast, TMS and
tDCS are regarded as relatively safe, although not entirely without risks. Single pulses of
TMS are considered very safe, and this approach has been used extensively to investigate
various aspects of human neurophysiology. On the other hand, repetitive TMS (rTMS) has
been associated with a small risk of inducing seizures, although rigorous safety guidelines
have been established to avoid this adverse event (Rossi et al. 2009; Wassermann 1998).
The most common side effect of TMS is mild and transient headaches. TDCS has not shown
any serious side effects, except for some tingling or itching under the electrodes, and
infrequent nausea, fatigue, and headache (Nitsche et al. 2008; Poreisz et al. 2007), and in
rare cases skin lesions (Palm et al. 2008). However, safety for tDCS has not been
extensively investigated in persons with skull defects or neuropsychiatric disorders (Brunoni
et al. 2012b), so caution should be exercised with these groups of patients. Naturally, an
important point to take into consideration is whether brain stimulation leads to long-term
changes in brain function. In non-clinical research, the changes in brain activity induced by
stimulation are believed to be transient, whereas in the clinical setting the goal is often to
achieve effects that persist well beyond the stimulation period. The possibility that these
therapies might induce permanent changes in the brain raises theoretical concerns that there
may be unintended neural consequences of stimulation.
When considering technologies that can potentially alter neurologic function, cognition, and
behavior, the notion of unintended consequences takes on special significance. Brains are
delicately balanced, intricately connected, and highly ordered systems; it is difficult, if not
impossible, to predict all the likely consequences of brain stimulation. Years from now we
may discover that repeated stimulation of a specific brain area has a beneficial effect on one
cognitive domain, but a deleterious effect on others. For example, there have been cases in
which the placement of DBS successfully treated patients’ motor deficits but also
exacerbated cognitive problems, depression, or (hypo)mania (Temel et al. 2006). There have
also been cases in which patients, despite improvement in motor function, experience
difficulties adapting to the expectations associated with being restored to a normal level of
function (Gilbert 2012). Numerous studies in cognitive neuroscience have employed TMS to
focally suppress activity, creating “virtual lesions” for investigative purposes (PascualLeone et al. 1999). This implies that TMS, in addition to having the capacity to induce
beneficial effects on cognition and behavior, could theoretically have the potential to induce
unintentional deleterious effects on neurologic function. In the case of tDCS the position and
polarity of electrodes is crucial, and there is evidence that unintentional electrode
misplacement or reversal of polarity can cause at least transient impairment of specific
cognitive functions (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2010) or induce maladaptive behavioral changes
(Fumagalli et al. 2010). The potential issue of unintended consequences due to brain
stimulation finds clear parallels with the unintended side effects of medications. However,
we believe that the targeted nature of brain stimulation increases the likelihood that the side
effects of these techniques will be cognitive and behavioral in nature, and that for this reason
these approaches merit special consideration. Insofar as brain function instantiates the
perceptual and cognitive experiences that comprise identity, personality, and self, one very
real possibility is that these technologies may affect these vital human abilities in
unpredictable and undesired ways, as we will discuss below.
Finally, directly linked to the idea of risks and benefits is the notion of the so-called “double
effect.” That is, there are situations in which we accept the deleterious effects of a treatment
in light of other beneficial effects (e.g. medications that alleviate pain but also shorten the
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lives of terminally ill patients). In the case of brain stimulation, there may be scenarios in
which known changes in neurologic function are deemed to be acceptable in light of specific
potential benefits. This raises difficult questions, including how much of a bad or
questionable effect do we tolerate for the sake of a desirable effect? How does one weigh
different mental abilities or neurological functions against each other? Who prioritizes these
abilities? Is it, for instance, appropriate to change a person such that he or she is worse at
mathematical reasoning but better with respect to verbal fluency? What about decreasing
empathy for the sake of increasing working memory? While it is largely speculative whether
brain stimulation is likely to lead to these kinds of cognitive trade-offs, it is worth
considering potential consequences such as these before we see them emerge in treated
patient populations. Will there be certain cognitive domains that should be inviolable with
respect to manipulation?
Although we cannot answer all of these questions, we can start to address them in common
sense ways. The issue of unintended consequences demands that researchers and clinicians
pay careful attention to their subjects or patients to detect any possible unexpected
deleterious effects of stimulation. This may require more careful scrutiny of a variety of
neurologic and cognitive domains aside from those that are being intentionally
experimentally or therapeutically manipulated. Publication of safety data and responsible
reporting of unexpected outcomes are also essential for defining the landscape of risks and
benefits associated with these technologies. As these risks and benefits of brain stimulation
become more completely known, issues of double effect will need to be addressed on an
individual study-by-study basis since the trade-off of risks to benefits will be dependent on
the nature of each investigation. In such instances, investigators must be willing to work
closely with regulatory bodies (e.g. Institutional Review Boards or the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration), who are charged with safeguarding the interests of subjects and patients
with respect to medical interventions.

Autonomy: searching for self in the stimulated brain
Direct manipulation of the brain—of which brain stimulation techniques are just one
example—can lead to changes that extend beyond modification of specific cognitive
abilities and behaviors. If permanent and significant changes in physiology are induced by
these interventions, they could affect the motives and other general dispositions that underlie
behavior (Bublitz and Merkel 2009). Thus, brain stimulation could theoretically be regarded
as an intervention that circumvents the normal capacities of individuals in order to alter
those capacities, in a sense “imposing itself over [ourselves]” (Levy 2007). This poses a
challenge when thinking about the principle of respect for autonomy. Here, we would like to
touch upon two interrelated issues of autonomy: informed consent and personhood.
Informed-consent, decision-making capacity and withdrawal
The notion that a patient or subject should only be subjected to an intervention if he or she is
well-informed, willing to participate, and free from coercion is fundamental to the ethical
conduct of medical research and clinical practice, and finds its foundations in the principle
of respect for autonomy. Several issues arise with respect to informed consent as it relates to
brain stimulation. The fact that many therapeutic applications of brain stimulation remain
experimental underscores the duty to fully inform individuals of the potential risks of these
techniques, as discussed above. In addition, as it is the case of DBS, most of the therapeutic
applications are only offered for treatment-refractory patients, which could mean that
patients are already in vulnerable states in which they might feel that they have no viable
options but to consent. Another issue that makes informed consent potentially problematic is
that many proposed and currently employed therapeutic applications of brain stimulation are
geared towards individuals with either psychiatric disorders or cognitive impairment. This
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further underscores the need to establish, on an individual basis, whether persons are capable
of providing appropriate consent. Extending this notion further, an assessment of the ethical
implications of these techniques must also take into consideration whether the cognitive and
behavioral effects of stimulation themselves alter the ability of individuals to provide or
withdraw consent (Heinrichs 2012; Schmitz-Luhn et al. 2012). Finally, a set of concerns
relates to whether the wider use of these technologies may eventually introduce either
explicit or implicit coercive pressure for individuals to undergo brain stimulation to treat real
or perceived cognitive or psychological impairments (Hamilton et al. 2011). While the issue
of coercion is not unique to brain stimulation, we should nonetheless be mindful that in our
competitive fast-paced society, more widespread implementation of techniques that can
potentially enhance mental activity may eventually lead to direct or indirect pressure on
individuals to make use of them.
The notion of capacity is of central concern in any discussion of informed consent (Klaming
and Haselager 2010). In the context of clinical care and medical research, capacity can be
defined by four key abilities: communication, understanding, appreciation, and
rationalization/reasoning (Applebaum & Grisso 1988). An individual must be able to not
only understand the information presented to them but also be able to apply the information
to their own personal situation and rationally explain the reason for the decision that they
made. A separate, but related concept is mental competence, which is a legal status that must
be demonstrated in order to start, continue, or stop any clinical or experimental manipulation
that entails intervening on an individual’s body or mind.2 With these definitions in mind,
clinicians and investigators employing brain stimulation techniques must be cognizant that
for individuals with certain conditions, particularly psychiatric disorders, the determination
of medical decision-making capacity may be quite complicated (Bell et al. 2009; Cabrera
2011; Schmitz-Luhn et al. 2012; Synofzik and Schlaepfer 2011). One reason for this is that
individuals’ treatment preferences 3 (Synofzik and Schlaepfer 2011) and decision-making
capacities (Cabrera 2011) are strongly influenced by mood and affect, which are in turn
affected in these types of conditions. Another reason is that the potential psychiatric side
effects of brain stimulation itself, such as mood changes or elevated anxiety, may be more
prevalent or pronounced in psychiatric patients. Thus, depending on the conditions for
which these techniques are used, additional efforts may be required in order to accurately
assess capacity, provide information, and acquire consent in a manner that is appropriate to
the abilities and needs of patients and subjects. While this determination can at times be
complicated, evidence suggests that providing clinicians with adequate knowledge of the
key components of capacity increases the reliability of their assessments (Marsden et al.,
2000). Moreover, in the broader field of medicine, structured clinical interviews and other
formal assessment instruments have proven helpful in making such determinations (Dunn et
al., 2006). In some cases capacity may be further informed by evaluation of cognitive
abilities and psychological states (see Appelbaum, 2007 for a brief review of assessment). In
short, for many current and future practitioners of brain stimulation, assessment of capacity
may represent a new clinical skill set that will need to be acquired.
Identity/personhood
Our sense of individual identity and our understanding of ourselves as distinct persons
derive largely from our ability to experience psychological continuity and persistence
through time as the same beings. Importantly, it has been argued that neural interventions
have the capacity to alter these experiences so profoundly that they may impact the

2The foundational document of research ethics, the Nuremberg Code, begins the first of its ten requirements with: “The voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential”.
3For instance, treatment-resistant patients might feel desperate to find a cure.
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experience of personhood (Farah and Wolpe 2004). This has been a major topic in the
discussion of ethical issues surrounding DBS in particular (Heinrichs 2012; Jotterand and
Giordano 2011; Klaming and Haselager 2010; Lipsman and Glannon 2012; Mathews 2011;
Schmitz-Luhn et al. 2012; Witt et al. 2011), and is also a theoretical concern for other brain
stimulation techniques.
There are certainly limits to what would be reasonable concerns regarding brain stimulation
and personhood. For instance, it would be difficult to argue that the individuals who receive
brain stimulation are abruptly transformed into wholly different persons by their experience.
This is because these techniques generally do not fundamentally disrupt the continuity and
persistence of mental experience. Moreover, practitioners of these techniques—perhaps
more so those who administer TMS and tDCS than DBS—can reasonably assert that, while
brain stimulation can potentially alter the neural states and experiences of its recipients,
these interventions do not affect the personhood or identity of individuals more than
psychopharmacological treatment or behavioral and cognitive therapies, all of which are
generally accepted by the public. The main questions for brain stimulation related to
personhood are therefore more along the lines of whether or not these technologies alter
aspects of selfhood in more subtle but nonetheless worrisome ways. While this concern
remains largely theoretical at this point, an issue as important as this will require more
comprehensive assessment of cognitive outcomes in studies that employ these techniques as
well as comparative studies with other brain intervention technologies. Here we will discuss
two specific concerns, one related to the short-term, reversible effects of brain stimulation,
and a second concern related to its enduring effects.
The putative reversibility of brain stimulation raises an intriguing question that relates both
to personhood and to informed consent: under which condition—stimulation on or off—
should an individual be approached regarding continuation or cessation of treatment? Stated
another way, it may be unclear whether a person whose cognition and affective capacities
have been temporarily changed by brain stimulation is fully entitled to make decisions on
behalf of the person they are when their brain is not being stimulated. Some patients might
have preferences while under the influence of stimulation that do not reflect their values in
the absence of stimulation. In some cases, it is possible that brain stimulation treatments
may affect cognition so profoundly that persons who previously were not considered to have
been competent medical decision-makers and advocates for themselves might be more
intellectually capable of decision-making after stimulation. Are there limits on a treated
individual’s ability to make decisions on behalf of his or her less capable future self, or vice
versa? On the other hand, one could also make the countervailing argument that the diseases
for which stimulation may be used as a therapy may have already altered patients’ initial
cognitive and affective functions. Extending this reasoning, it could potentially be argued
that therapeutic interventions, including brain stimulation, allow patients to make decisions
in a state that is more akin to their pre-morbid, and perhaps preferred, selves. Regarding the
decision-making rights of the treated self versus the untreated self, some insights can be
gleaned from the field of psychiatry, wherein patients who are being treated
pharmacologically for mental conditions are generally allowed to guide their decisionmaking in both the treated condition and the untreated condition, provided they are deemed
to have the capacity to do so in both states. There are, however, situations in which patients’
ability to control their treatment are curtailed, for instance when it is deemed that by
refusing treatment, the mental states and behaviors of these individuals put either themselves
or others in imminent danger.
While the cognitive and psychological effects induced by TMS, tDCS, and DBS are
generally thought of as being reversible, there is evidence that suggests that prolonged or
repeated stimulation can lead to lasting changes in neural function. Extending this notion,
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persistent changes in neural activity may manifest in long-lasting alterations of elements of a
person’s perception, cognition, motivations, and behavior that touch upon the fundamental
nature of who they are. In many cases these changes in self will be desired by the
individuals receiving stimulation, and may be the main objective of their treatment. Indeed,
just as some patients taking psychoactive medications report that they feel more like their
“authentic selves” while on treatment than off (Kramer 1994), some persons receiving
stimulation may find their stimulated state to be more in accordance with their notion of
themselves (or with their notion of who they would like to be). On the other hand, as we
touched upon in our discussion of risks and benefits, the limitless complexities of the brain
and our limited experience with brain stimulation make it entirely plausible that extensive
use of these technologies could lead to changes that are unanticipated, undesired, or both,
such as significant changes in our personalities and concepts of who we are. We may
already have examples of such cases with respect to invasive brain stimulation, and as more
data is gathered from minimally invasive stimulation we will begin to develop a clearer
sense of whether this is also a realistic concern with these technologies.
Arguments connected to identity and personhood do not translate readily into concrete,
practical, and systematic criteria for guiding research and clinical decision-making
(Synofzik and Schlaepfer 2011). Nonetheless, they are important for persons in the field of
brain stimulation to consider, as they could have far-reaching consequences for subjects,
patients, and caregivers, as well as the social environments in which persons living in
‘altered states’ interact (Baylis 2011). These concerns should prompt more research into the
significance and long-term impact of brain stimulation on the components of mental
experience that contribute to identity and personhood, as well as identification of the
conditions, stimulation parameters, and patient populations wherein fundamental changes in
mental experience are most likely to occur. In this way practitioners of brain stimulation
could provide anticipatory guidance to allow stimulation recipients to make informed
decisions about desired and undesired changes in being.

Justice: fairness and equity in brain stimulation
The concept of justice encompasses the idea the benefits should not be unfairly denied to
individuals without good reason and also the notion that specific groups of individuals
should not by unduly burdened (Sims 2010). In research and clinical settings these ideas find
their application in the equitable distribution of medical resources, technologies, and
research priorities. Because DBS, TMS, and tDCS vary widely with respect to cost,
equipment needs, and administrator expertise, the three technologies need to be considered
separately with respect to distributive justice. DBS is by far the most resource-intensive
brain stimulation technique as it involves the cost of the implanted electrode system, the
labor of a skilled neurosurgeon and clinical staff, and the cost of brief hospitalization. The
resource requirements associated with both TMS and tDCS are significantly less, although
there a considerable difference in cost and equipment needs between these two minimally
invasive techniques as well. As noted above, compared to tDCS, TMS involves components
(e.g. a stimulation unit and neuronavigational system) that are larger, heavier, and require a
constant power supply. Thus, compared to both DBS and TMS, tDCS is inexpensive,
portable, requires the least additional resources, and requires the least specific training in
order to implement. These properties may eventually facilitate the widespread use of this
technology, insofar as tDCS could be used in places with limited resources or where the
medical or technological infrastructure is not sufficient to maintain the other two techniques
(Pascual-Leone et al. 2011). Therapeutic brain stimulation is currently delivered in an
inequitable manner. At least in the US, the high cost of DBS limits its implementation
largely to patients with health insurance, while many patients who receive TMS for
depression must possess the means to pay for treatment out of pocket. However, while
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distributive justice is certainly an important ethical issue that pertains to brain stimulation,
we assert that this issue is not unique to these techniques. It is the rule rather than the
exception that when innovative technologies are introduced into the public sphere they are at
first the almost exclusive purview of a privileged group of individuals. This is certainly the
case in the medical field, where persons with resources—whether those resources be
personal wealth or the right kind of medical insurance—have nearly unfettered access to
advanced medical treatments, while individuals without access do not. Thus, inequity with
respect to brain stimulation simply serves as another instance of the “widening gap between
rich and poor with respect to almost all aspects of life” (Hamilton et al. 2011). Importantly,
we do not mean to imply that efforts to enhance fairness with respect to brain stimulation are
either misguided or futile. Rather, our point is that inequity in the administration of brain
stimulation is reflective of a larger issue of distributive justice that is endemic to medicine in
the industrialized world.

Discussion
We have tried to make the case that, although not all the ethical issues brought forward by
brain stimulation are unique to these techniques, there are certain aspects that indeed require
special attention. Moreover, while we do not assert that all ethical issues play the same role
for DBS, TMS, and tDCS, the basic idea of stimulating the brain—be it electrically or
magnetically, invasively or minimally invasively—implies commonalities among the three
techniques. We do not need to reinvent the wheel for assessing the ethical aspects of every
clinical and research area to be explored for each one of these techniques, but we also do not
want to overgeneralize and overlook their differences.
We have also emphasized issues that brain stimulation techniques engender related to the
foundational principles of medical ethics: beneficence and nonmaleficence, autonomy and
justice. Insofar as most proposed therapeutic applications of brain stimulation are still only
in the experimental or in some cases conceptual stage, these ‘early days’ for the field are an
opportune time for clinicians and investigators to reflect on their fiduciary responsibilities
with respect to patients and subjects undergoing brain stimulation. The clinician-patient
relationship defines a bond of trust that is of paramount importance in the practice of
medicine, including therapeutic brain stimulation. One issue that could threaten that
relationship is the fact that many clinical practitioners of these techniques are themselves
investigators, setting the stage for a possible conflict of interest between the best interests of
patients and the desire to demonstrate the efficacy of brain stimulation techniques. Faced
with strong professional incentives to demonstrate positive results, and faced with patient
populations who are highly motivated to pursue treatments they hope will help them,
clinicians and investigators must strive to maintain both transparency and equipoise with
respect to the benefits and risks of treatment, and work to communicate these, as free from
bias as possible, to potential patients and subjects. Thus leadership from practitioners and
researchers is required in this burgeoning field in order to create and maintain standards of
ethical conduct for research with human subjects.
To summarize the issues we have touched upon in this paper we want to make three basic
points:
1.

The therapeutic use of brain stimulation can be guided by the same framework of
ethical principles that inform other fields of medical research and treatment,
including beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice.

2.

Issues in brain stimulation related to nonmaleficence, beneficence, and distributive
justice are relatively well informed by ethical thinking in other areas of medicine.
As the body of research evidence and clinical experience related to brain
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stimulation continues to expand, we anticipate that treatment parameters will be
continually refined to optimize the benefits, minimize the risks, and determine
which techniques are most effective for specific clinical indications.
3.

Autonomy is a particularly thorny issue with respect to brain stimulation because
we are dealing with treatments that can potentially change aspects of subjects and
patients that relate to their identity and personhood. Thus far the literature has
focused mainly on DBS and potential changes to identity, but TMS or tDCS could
theoretically induce similar changes despite their minimally invasive
characteristics. Some lessons regarding how to deal with challenges connected to
autonomy and brain stimulation techniques can be gleaned from the field of
psychiatry. However, additional answers will need to come from cognitive
neuroscience, as we explore how our brains instantiate our thoughts, and how our
thoughts instantiate our identities as rational actors with autonomy and agency.

In closing, we would like to point out two foreseeable future ethical challenges related to
brain stimulation. The first of these is the slippery slope of clinical necessity. At issue is the
concern that practitioners of brain stimulation may someday be pressured to ‘treat’ cognitive
or psychological states that many would consider to be part of the spectrum of normal
human ability rather than pathology. In such cases, the boundaries between treatment of
disease and enhancement of normal cognition could easily be blurred. The notion that
therapies initially developed to treat pathological brain states could be directed toward more
cosmetic applications is neither far-fetched nor far off in the future. For the sake of
comparison, consider underachieving students who get treated with Ritalin when it is not
clear they meet the criteria for attention deficit disorder or the individual who feels ‘down in
the dumps’ and is prescribed a small dose of an antidepressant for symptoms that do not
meet the clinical criteria for major depression. There is nothing that speaks against the
possibility that brain stimulation will be any different. Given the invasive nature and cost
associated with DBS, it is easier to envision individuals obtaining TMS or tDCS for the
purposes of cognitive or emotional enhancement. However, there are circumstances under
which individuals may be motivated to use DBS for reasons other than its clinical
indications, such as cases in which patients have experienced “morphine-like” feelings
associated with stimulation (Morgan et al. 2006). Given that there are DBS systems that
allow patients to control when they are stimulated, these cases raise questions regarding who
should be able to exercise control over implanted brain stimulators, and whether there is a
potential for intentional misuse.
A second, foreseeable issue that is closely tied to the notion of cosmetic neural enhancement
is the potential for self-treatment by the public. Currently, this issue might be only limited to
tDCS, given the equipment and costs associated with the TMS and DBS. Simply put,
building a tDCS device is not rocket science, and a rudimentary system can be put together
with less than $100 and a basic understanding of electronics. Consequently, there are
currently individuals who are actively engaged in self-experimentation and self-treatment
using home-made tDCS units. This effort is fostered by so-called “do-it-yourself” and
“biohackers” movements (http://brmlab.cz/project/brain_hacking/tdcs), and by a number of
publically accessible websites and videos that provide the schematics for building a tDCS
unit as well as testimonials from individuals that have tried these home-made devices on
themselves. While self-experimentation with a home-made brain stimulator may sound to
some like eccentric behaviour, the notion of magnetically or electrically enhancing cognitive
abilities is one that may have broad appeal to an increasingly technology-dependent public.
In a recent survey of an unselected group of 1000 respondents, we found that 87% would be
willing to use minimally invasive brain stimulation to enhance their intellectual ability or
performance at work or school (Hamilton, personal communication), reinforcing the idea
that people could use tDCS for “nonresearch and nontherapeutic objectives” (Brunoni et al.
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2012b). Insofar as brain stimulation techniques may also have benefits in boosting mood or
improving sleep, it is possible to envision situations in which individuals could use
stimulation as a means of self-medication before going to a qualified medical doctor, akin to
self-treatment with over-the-counter medications.
The notion of healthy persons stimulating themselves for the sake of cognitive selfenhancement raises fascinating questions with respect to autonomy and the fiduciary
responsibilities of practitioners of brain stimulation. Modern Western society tends to
recognize the primacy of autonomy, leaning heavily towards persons being free to do as they
wish with their minds and bodies, provided they do not harm others in doing so. Since no
permanent adverse effects of either TMS or tDCS have been conclusively demonstrated, one
could easily make the argument that individuals should be allowed to stimulate their brains
should they desire to do so. However, with so much still unknown about the neural
mechanisms and long-term effects of brain stimulation, the notion of unregulated public
usage may be worrisome to some practitioners who currently administer these techniques.
To that end, the community of clinicians and researchers in this field may someday feel
obligated, for the sake of public safety, to inform and advise non-professionals with respect
to self-administration of minimally invasive brain stimulation. In this situation, the principle
of nonmaleficence (“first do no harm”) takes on special significance, and it would be
worthwhile for the community of practitioners and investigators working with these
technologies to consider whether guidelines for public use—based on data and expert
experience—would be appropriate. Thus, in addition to developing and refining best
practices of medical research and clinical care, ethical leadership with respect to the use of
minimally invasive brain stimulation may also eventually call for proactive steps to be taken
in both public education and public policy.
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Fig. 1. Published Papers related to Brain Stimulation (2001–2011)

Data were acquired by searching pubmed.gov for articles using “deep brain stimulation OR
DBS” “transcranial magnetic stimulation OR TMS,” or transcranial direct current
stimulation or tDCS” in the title and by publication date (2001–2011). All searches were
conducted on December 8th, 2012
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